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A specific instantiation of classical correlation from entangled quantum resources can be 
established at a distance through the use of local measurements without classical communication.  
It is thereby possible to, e.g., develop a game in which distant entities can randomly combine 
forces on a course of action which is an element of a predetermined set of possible actions.  
When this protocol is used, none of the participants in the game knows which action has been 
chosen.  The protocol is intrinsically secure in the same sense as a one-time pad.  The entities 
must have a shared entanglement resource, be able to measure that resource in a predetermined 








 An alternate title to this paper might be ‘Correlated Choice of Classical Actions using 
only Quantum Entanglement and Classical Precommunication’.   We use the term 
‘precommunication’ to indicate that entities have shared classical information at some time 
before their choice is made.  This might be done by an earlier physical meeting or through prior 
classical communication at a distance.   
The idea investigated here is that correlated but mutually unknown actions of a set of 
agents which lead toward a goal chosen randomly from a set of potential goals can be established 
at a distance using only shared quantum entanglement, local measurements, and 
precommunicated classical information.  The result is that a random selection of a set of classical 
actions can be made evident to all entities required to carry out the actions without classical 
communication.  Any central agency will remain ignorant of the action chosen.  This scheme is 
intrinsically secure in the same sense that a one-time pad is secure.   
Imagine that Terorg, a terrorist organization, wants to execute a nefarious strike.  
Wanting to make defense against the strike as difficult as possible and having unimaginable 
resources, Terorg have prepared the ground for a set S of n possible strikes S = {s1, s2, …,sn }.  
However, Terorg have no preference as to which of the strikes is actually carried out – secrecy of 
the choice made and the identity of the agents involved is the primary consideration.   
Alice and Bob are agents for the terrorist organization Terorg.  (We will restrict our 
present discussion to the case of 2 field agents.)  Neither Alice nor Bob know each other’s 
identity or what the goals of the set of strikes are.  They are merely to carry out a 
precommunicated sequence of actions on command which, when properly correlated, 
collectively serve to carry out a strike s which corresponds to one of the elements of S.   
Alice and Bob have a controller Carl, who is their sole contact with Terorg.  Carl’s task is 
to insure that Alice and Bob both carry out a series of individual actions which insure that a 
randomly chosen member of the set of strikes is carried out.  The maximum possible security is 
required, so as not to alert the targets of the strikes or to expose the agents.  For simplicity 
assume that S has 2n elements – therefore, each element of S can be described using n entangled 
two-state systems to establish a binary action integer which labels the individual actions leading 
to a particular strike.   
The state of a finite-dimensional quantum mechanical system is a vector |R> in some 
complex n-dimensional Hilbert space Hn.  (The quantum state is actually a ray, but this 
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distinction is unimportant here.)  Let Hn have an orthonormal basis β = {|σ1>, |σ2>, …, |σn>}.  In 
that case, a state |Ψ> in Hn can be expressed as |Ψ> = α Σ ηi |σi>, where the ηI are complex 
amplitudes and α is an overall normalization factor.  We will be interested in states |Ψ> for 
which we can set all ηI = {0,1} in the basis β.  As usual, two quantum states are entangled when 
they are not separable. 
Carl prepares a set of n entangled pairs of two-state systems.  For simplicity we shall 
assume that n=1 for the current discussion.  In Carl’s computational basis ∑, the entangled pair 
has the state vector |Ψ> = 2-1/2 [ |0>1 |0>2 + |1>1 |1>2 ].  He records this quantum state in two 
(decoherence-free) quantum memories, and gives one of the quantum memories to each of Alice 
and Bob.  As they are maximally entangled as described above, it really doesn’t matter who gets 
which particle.  Alice and Bob also have equipment to align the orientation of their quantum 
memory basis to that of the basis Σ.   
Carl now precommunicates Alice’s actions.  He informs Alice as to what actions she is to 
take when she measures the quantum state in the Σ basis, obtaining a |0> state or a |1> state.  
Neither Carl nor Alice needs to know what two strikes are to be carried out by these two sets of 
actions.  For maximum security, Dave, another member of Terorg, precommunicates to Bob the 
actions he is to carry out when he measures a |0> state or a |1> state.  Introducing Dave yields the 
situation where neither Carl nor Dave individually knows all the actions required to carry out any 
of the strikes.  This yields a significant increase in security, as knowing all the actions would 
probably allow them to accurately guess the identity of the possible strikes.  In addition, no 
classical communication following the quantum state distribution is required with Terorg, so that 
protecting the identity of the agents does not depend on the security or anonymity of a classical 
channel.  In this situation, Carl and Dave essentially carry out the function of chain cutouts, 
neither of whom has a complete picture of Terorg’s intentions.   
Terorg headquarters clearly know the set of potential strikes, but no one can tell them 
which strike will be carried out.  Neither Carl nor Dave knows what binary number corresponds 
to which strike, or what binary number will result from the quantum state measurements carried 
out by Alice and Bob.  Alice and Bob’s  measurements of the states stored in their quantum 
memories will determine which actions will be carried out, but not even Terorg headquarters can 
know which strike is to be carried out.   
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At some time before the earliest action of the set of strikes, Alice and Bob measure the 
state stored in their quantum memories, thereby obtaining their binary action number.  There is a 
50-50 chance of choosing either set of actions, and the quantum entanglement ensures that Alice 
and Bob choose correlated sets of actions by which they will combine forces on the same strike.  
The strike is chosen randomly in the measurement process, so that Alice and Bob combine forces 
on a strike the identity of which neither they nor Terorg headquarters can identify. 
The procedure outlined above is reminiscent of the pseudo-telepathy of Brassard et al.1, 
in which pseudo-telepathy is defined as an n-party game which cannot be won classically, but 
which can be won using quantum correlations at a distance.   
Brassard et al. define a two-party game as a sextuple G = <X, Y, A, B, P, W>, where X, 
Y, A, and B are sets, P ⊆ X x Y and W ⊆ X x Y x A x B.   X and Y are input sets, A and B are 
output sets, P as a predicate on X x Y known as the promise, and W as the winning condition, 
which is a relation between inputs x  ∈ X and y ∈ Y, and outputs a ∈ A and b ∈ B that has to be 
satisfied by A and B whenever the promise is fulfilled.  A and B also win if {x, y} ∉ promise P. 
At the outset of the game, A and B are allowed to discuss strategy and exchange any 
amount of classical information, including the value of random variables.  If A and B are 
quantum players, they are also allowed to share unlimited amounts of entanglement.  A and B are 
now separated so as to make further classical communication impossible.   
A and B are each presented with questions x ∈ X and y  ∈ Y respectively.  A and B 
respond with answers a ∈ A and b ∈ B.  A and B win the round if {x, y, a, b} ∈ W, and A and B 
have a winning strategy if they continue to win as long as they have not exhausted the classical 
communication and quantum entanglement shared at the beginning of the game.  A game 
exhibits pseudo-telepathy if there is no winning strategy when A and B are classical players, but 
does have a winning strategy provided A and B share a sufficient supply of quantum 
entanglement.   
Although there is some apparent similarity between correlation of classical actions based 
on quantum entanglement and prior classical communication, these two processes are in fact 
rather different in operation and limitations.  Perhaps the most obvious distinction is given by 
Brassard et al.2, who prove that a minimal two-party pseudo-telepathy game requires an 
entangled quantum system of dimension at least 3x3.  As the scheme described above requires a 
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Hilbert space only of dimension 2x2, the underlying structure is clearly different from that of 
pseudo-telepathy. 
It is clear that our protocol is intrinsically secure in the same sense as is a one-time pad.  
That is, there are no communications to intercept, so the only way in which in which Eve can 
attempt an attack is to physically copy or otherwise obtain the information in the pad.  As the 
choice of strikes is not made until Alice or Bob measures the entangled state stored in their 
quantum memory, an attack requires that an additional state be entangled with Alice and/or 
Bob’s entangled state in a manner so that Eve can obtain the information they have following 
their measurements.  (We assume that if Eve can gain access to the entangled quantum states, she 
can also access the list coupling Alice and Bob’s measurement results to the various strikes.)   
Eve can try to use an entanglement-based attack to discover the binary action number 
shared by Alice and Bob by infiltrating Terorg headquarters and preparing sets of entangled 
triples rather than entangled pairs.  Admittedly, this requires additional resources and equipment, 
but we will assume Eve is so clever that no one notices the extra equipment.  Eve then keeps one 
of each entangled triple in her pocket for later reference. 
Biseparable states3 (e.g., |101>+|110> = |1> ⊗ [|01> + |10>]) are of no use to Eve, as one 
qubit remains unentangled, so that one of the three participants would always measure a value 
uncorrelated to the binary action number.  There are only two classes of genuine entangled 
triples, the GHZ state and the W state4.  Ignoring normalization, the GHZ state is |000> + |111> 
in the basis Σ, and the W state is |011> + |101> + |110> in the same basis.   
Preparation of W state triples is not useful for eavesdropping on the binary action 
number.  Eve makes a measurement in basis Σ of her particle from a W state triple.  If Eve 
measures a |0> state, she does know that Alice and Bob have both measured |1> states.  
However, if her result is |1>, then the other particles are in a Bell state, and Eve gains no 
information as to Alice and Bob’s measurement results.  As a result, Eve cannot eavesdrop on 
Alice and Bob.  At best, she can execute a denial of service attack, using the W-induced mixing 
of Alice and Bob’s quantum states.   
When a measurement in the basis Σ is made of any particle in the GHZ triple, the result is 
a separable state (|0>|0> if |0> is measured or |1>|1> if |1> is measured).  Accordingly, the post-
measurement quantum state of the triple is no longer entangled.  However, following a 
measurement in basis Σ (assuming the particles remain effectively isolated from their 
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environment) the measured value and the remaining two particles remain completely correlated – 
they will all exhibit the same measurement in basis Σ.  Since in the sample protocol described 
above Alice and Bob depend only on obtaining the same measurement result, this initial loss of 
entanglement does not invalidate the protocol.  (Note that if the entanglement vanishes while the 
correlation in measurement results remains,  entanglement monogamy5 does not prevent this 
protocol from being used by three or more agents.)  Thus, if Eve can produce GHZ triples and 
keep one member of each entangled triple in her pocket, she can eavesdrop on the binary action 
number (although one person’s ‘eavesdropping’ might be another person’s ‘headquarters file 
copy’).  In fact, Eve can identify the strike long before Alice and Bob carry it out, simply by 
measuring her particles first.   
A physical attack on this protocol by an outside party (Wolf) can be made if Wolf knows 
the details of the protocol, the order of the particles relative to the desired binary action number, 
and the measurement basis Σ, and can obtain temporary custody (presumably illicitly) of one of 
Alice or Bob’s set of particles.  In this case Wolf can, in principle, use the N members of (say) 
Bob’s set of particles as control states for a CNOT gate, and use additional particles in an 
appropriate quantum state as target states.  E.g., if Alice and Bob’s particles are in the same 
quantum state and Wolf uses |0> states as target states for the CNOT gate, the result is a set of 
GHZ triples of entangled particles.  These can be used to reveal the key to Wolf as described 
above.  This is analogous to stealing and copying a one-time pad.   
The quantum correlation protocol described above does, in a perfect world, allow Alice 
and Bob to share a binary action number which is intrinsically secure in the usual meaning of 
that phrase.  However, the world is not perfect – even when there is no quantum channel to 
exhibit noise, measurements can yield incorrect results as the result of a wide range of errors.  
Accordingly, it is worth investigating if there is any means for Alice and Bob to reconcile their 
individual binary action numbers6.  If we attempt to maintain the complete isolation of Alice and 
Bob, it appears that conventional reconciliation is not possible, as that would require existence of 
a quantum and/or a classical channel between them.   
How long a string of bits can, with high probability, be sent using our protocol?  This 
length is largely controlled by the single-bit error probability є through Shannon’s Coding 
Theorem7.  This theorem provides a relationship between the number of bits n shared by Alice 
and Bob, the single-bit error probability ∈, and the number of bits r which must be 
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communicated between Alice and Bob to correct their strings.  If we require r<1, the result is a 
rough limit on the length n of Alice and Bob’s error-free strings:   
n < [-∈log2∈ - (1-∈)log2(1-∈)] -1 
To obtain long strings with large probability of agreement requires very small error rates.  
For example, if ∈=10-4, the probable length of error-free strings is <700.   We do not expect such 
small error rates in quantum measurements, although the possibility does exist.  Using a more 
realistic (at present) error rate of .01, the probable string length is less than 13.  Even though it is 
likely that a binary action string will be short, it seems likely that single-bit error rates of less 
than about 0.001 will be required.   
Another approach to the sharing of identical binary action numbers presumes that Alice 
and Bob can both apply algorithms to substrings of M bits and thereby distill, without 
communication, single bits a and b which have a higher probability of agreeing than do the initial 
substrings.  This problem has been studied by Mossel and O’Donnell8.  They prove that, for a 
binary symmetric noise model (essentially P(ai=bi) = 1-∈, P(ai≠bi) = ∈ with unbiased statistics), 
there is no procedure to perform such distillation.  In fact, Yang9 has shown that the maximum 
correlation between a and b is 1-2∈, which can in fact be achieved by choosing a single 
corresponding bit from each substring.  The choice of a single bit with an error probability of ∈, 
of course, does not assist Alice and Bob to agree on a random sequence.   
It is now clear that, unless short error-free strings or longer strings with some errors are 
acceptable for Terorg’s purposes, it will prove necessary to have some classical communication 
after measuring the particles.  In this case, the usual procedures for reconciliation can be used to 
correct errors between Alice and Bob’s strings.   
 At first sight, the proposed protocol seems an unlikely candidate for real-world 
application.  However, it does serve to point out, in a rather simple example, the power that 
quantum entanglement provides compared to purely classical processes.  Additionally, the rapid 
technical progress toward, e.g., entangled clock synchronization and entangled satellite 
communication stations suggests that our current estimates on the practical limitations of 
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